

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

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13-L
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 PM-03 NSC-05

SP-02 SS-20 RSC-01 IO-04 CIAE-00 INR-05 NSAE-00 PRS-01

SAM-01 DRC-01 INRE-00 /054 W
----- 107306

O 120900Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHC IMMEDIATE 4183
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 5810

DEPT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJ: SPECIAL KNESSET SESSION: REASONS FOR DELAY IN SHOWDOWN

REF: A. TEL AVIV 5732; B. TEL AVIV 5756

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. REF A RAISED PROSPECT THAT SPECIAL
KNESSET SESSION OCT 9 MIGHT SEE GOVERNMENT CONFRONTED WITH
MEANINGFUL CHALLENGE ON WEST BANK POLICY FROM NRP AND LIKUD.
HOWEVER, BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION CONTENTED SELVES
WITH PRO FORMA RE STATEMENTS OF EXISTING POSITIONS AND AGREED
TO CONDUCT FULLER DEBATE AFTER KNESSET RECONVENES OCT 21 (REF B).
REASONS BEHIND BOTH SIDES BACKING AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION
ON OCT 9 ARE OFFERED BY HARIF IN OCT 11 MAARIV. IN ESSENCE,
RABIN WANTED TO AVOID POSSIBLE RIFT WITH RAFI FACTION AND
DAYAN FELT UNABLE TO EITHER SUPPORT, OR BREAK WITH, GOVERNMENT.
CONSENSUS WAS TO WAIT TO SEE WHAT SECRETARY BRINGS. END
SUMMARY.

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2. HARIF WRITES: QUOTE IF THE GOVERNMENT HAD MOVED TO STRIKE THE LIKUD MOTION, IT WOULD HAVE FOUND ITSELF IN THE MINORITY, WHICH WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO MORAL VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE. RABIN'S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD 'CONSIDER' WITHDRAWALS ON WEST BANK IN RETURN FOR MERE NON-BELLIGERENCY REPORTEDLY MADE DAYAN FURIOUS AND CONFRONTED HIM WITH CHOICE BETWEEN VOTING AGAINST GOVERNMENT OR STAYING AWAY FROM THE KNESSET--WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS RUNNING AWAY. A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE KNESSET SESSION, RABIN WAS AWARE THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ON REST OF RAFI AS WELL--AND THAT MEANT ANOTHER SIX VOTES. THE PROBLEM SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOLVED BY PERES, WHO ALLEGEDLY PROPOSED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF MOVE A DEBATE...

3. QUOTE. WHAT IS CERTAIN NOW, THOUGH, IS THAT RAFI WILL NOT VOTE FOR A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL ON THE WEST BANK IN RETURN FOR NON-BELLIGERENCY. WHICH TURNS THE ISSUE INTO ONE OF TO BE OR NOT TO BE FOR THE RABIN CABINET. COOPTING THE NRP AS AN INSURANCE AGAINST DAYAN WILL NOT COVER THIS PARTICULAR RISK. IN FACT, THEY ARE KNOWN TO INSIST THAT BEFORE THEY JOIN, RABIN MUST PROMISE NOT TO DECIDE ON A WITHDRAWAL FROM JERICHO WITHOUT ELECTIONS...

4. QUOTE. AT A CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS THIS WEEK, THE ALMOST COMPLETE CONSENSUS WAS THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO HEAR WHAT KISSINGER HAD TO SAY BEFORE DECIDING WHAT LINE TO TAKE. BUT HE WILL HARDLY BRING GOOD TIDINGS. RABIN HAS SPOKEN QUITE EMOTIONALLY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S NEED TO BE CONVINCED THAT IT HAS DONE ALL TO FIND A 'REASONABLE' ROAD TO PEACE. BUT KISSINGER, FOR INSTANCE, DOES NOT THINK INSISTING ON A FORMAL NON-BELLIGERENCY DECLARATION IN RETURN FOR ANY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS REASONABLE. END QUOTE.

5. COMMENT: RATIONALE OF HARIF MATCHES OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHY EVENTS AT KNESSET OCT 9 WERE SO TAME AND THROWS LIGHT ON CURRENT CONSTELLATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL FORCES IN ISRAEL. ONE CAN ADD THAT ORP WOULD HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY CHOOSING BETWEEN VOTING AGAINST GOVERNMENT IT IS TRYING HARD TO JOIN AND VOTING WITH GOVERNMENT BEING CHALLENGED AT THE TIME IN NUMEROUS POINTS ON WEST BANK BY ITS OWN YOUTH FACTION. NOR IS LIKUD SUFFICIENTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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UNIFIED ON TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE ISSUE TO HAVE BEEN EAGER FOR SHOWDOWN, ESPECIALLY IN ABSENCE OF BEGIN. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT ALL PARLIAMENTARY ELEMENTS AGREED TO TAKE REFUGE IN FURTHER DELAY.
KEATING

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECRETARY'S PARTY.

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NNN

Message Attributes

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